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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

.l'

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

MLPH LEROY MENZIES,

Case No.

16323

Defendant-Appellant.
' 1~

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, appeals from the conviction of the crime of Escape in the Third Judicial District Court,
' i~

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, was found guilty
by a jury be fore the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding,

of the crime of Escape on January 22, 1979, and was thereafter

sentenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law .
.1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
1,-

Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new
:rial.

Counsel on appeal requests permission to withdraw from the
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appeal and submits this brief in compliance with Anders v. California,

t

386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 93 (1967).
Cl

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Cl

According to Carl H. Loerbs, a counselor at the Utah State
Prison, on the evening of the 6th of July, 1978, he was assigned to
1'

count the prisoners confined to a particular area of minimum

tl

security.

On the evening of July 6, 1978, at the hour of 11:00

fl

p.m. Mr. Loerbs made a count and in "K" Dorm could not locate Ralph
Wi

Henzies

nor Johnny Sloan, another inmate assigned to "K" Dorm.

Mr. Loerbs then made a physical search of the entire "K" Dorm area
and was not able to locate either individual.

z:

Mr. Loerbs identified

al

the appellant as being the same Ralph Leroy Menzies who had previous!:
been in "K" Dorm of minif'"lum security and further said that the

cr
rr

appellant did not have permission to his knowledge to leave the

ic

institution on that occasion.

rt

Mr. Loerbs also testified that his knowledge of the nature
of the commitment of the appellant was based on the assumption that
there was a valid commitment order and that he had no direct evidence
that the appellant was a bona fide inmate.

th

fa

al

Ron Hinckley, who was a correctional counselor at the Utah
State Prison, testified that he searched for the escapees on the

Gr

th

evening of July 6, 1978, and early morning hours of the July 7, 1978.
and that he found a door that apparently had been forced open.

St

11e

He

'.')
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.§_,

testified that he did not see

them again for some time.

The State called George Byron Stark who introduced a
copy of a judgment that purported to be an authenticated copy of a
commitment of Ralph Leroy Menzies to prison.

Mr. Gregory L. Bown,

e
a Deputy County Attorney, was called to say that on September 10,
1976, he was present and witnessed the appellant being committed
to prison pursuant to the case out of which the commitment theretofure entered into evidence had been filed.

Charles L. Illsley

was called as a witness and testified that on the evening of July
22, 1978, in the course of a routine patrol, he arrested the
appellant at about 12:45 a.m.

He further testified that the

appellant gave the name of Lee Stevens and the address of 55 White

sl

·Cherry Way, and that he denied having any identification on him.
The witness further stated that at a subsequent point he saw an

identification card protruding from appellant's wallet, removed
the wallet from the truck and discovered that it contained Utah
State Prison identification to Ralph Leroy Menzies.

Pursuant to

that investigation, the officer subsequently arrested the appellant
:e

for the charge of Escape.

The State then rested, but later was

allowed to reopen to call Joy Greenwood to the stand.

Joy

Greenwood testified that she was a keeper of the prison records,
that she had with her the prison inmate record of Ralph Leroy
11enzies, that the record revealed that he was there pursuant to
2

valid sentence, and that that sentence had not been terminated,

~Jided

or he had not been paroled at the time of his alleged escape.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mrs. Greenwood further stated on cross-examination that the mere
fact that a file was in her possession was not evidence that the
person to whom that filed referred was, in fact, in the Utah
State Prison.

She further testified that in order to show that the

appellant's sentence had not been terminated, voided, or that he
had not been put on parole, she relied on the absence of a partieular entry in the file, rather than any individual entry in the
file itself.

In addition Mrs. Greenwood testified that numerous

people had access to the file and that it was possible that they
could have altered or destroyed portions of that file without
her knowledge.

POINT I
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE
VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
This Court has on several occasions stated the rules
concerning the granting of a new trial on the basis that the verdict
was not supported by the evidence.

In State v. Cooper, 114 Ut.

531, 201 P.2d 764, 770 (1949), this Court stated:
The question of granting or denying a motion for
a new trial is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. This court cannot
substitute its discretion for that of the trial
court. We do not ordinarily interfere with the

- 4 -
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rulings of the trial court in either granting
or denying a new trial, and unless abuse of, or
failure to exercise, discretion on the part of
the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the
ruling of the trial court will be sustained.
While in appellant's case there was no motion for a new
trial, the above language would seem to indicate under what circumstances this Court will grant a new trial even in the absence of
amotion for a new trial.

The Court also stated:

The state's evidence is so inherently improbable
as to be unworthy of belief so that upon objective analysis it appears that reasonable
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was guilty, the jury's
verdict cannot stand.
Conversely, if the
state's evidence was such that reasonable
Qinds could believe beyond a reasonable doubt
the defendant was guilty, the verdict must
be sustained.
State v. Mills, 122 Ut. 306,
249 P.2d 211 (1952).
It is apparent from these various statements of the law
that this Court does have the power to order a new trial in appropriate cases.

This Court has said that:

We are not unmindful of the settled rule that
it is the province of the jury to weigh the
testimony and determine the facts.
Nevertheless, we cannot escape the responsibility of
judgment upon whether under the evidence, a
jury could, and reason, conclude the defendant's
guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Williams, 111 Ut. 379, 180 P.2d 551,
555 (1947.)
Clearly each case must turn upon its own facts and circ~mstances

to whether or not a new trial is warranted because the

- 5 provided
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

verdict was not supported by the evidence.

Appellant contends that

in the case before the Court the verdict was not supported by the
evidence and therefore he should be granted a new trial.
POINT II
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTION
IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE AND DISMISSAL OF THAT
CHARGE BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
rniAL.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy .

. trial".

This provision is embodied in the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and hence is
applicable to

state prosecutions as well as federal prosecutions.

Klopfer v. North Caro:ina, 386 U.S. 213, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1, 87 S.Ct.
988 (1967).
Case law reflects certain general principles:
1)

The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative;

2)

That it is constitutionally persmissible for there to

be some delay in prosecuting a criminal case, but not inordinate,
purposeful or oppressive delay; and
3.

Whether the delay involved in completing a particular

criminal prosecution violates the accused's right to a speedy trial
depends upon the circumstances.
The Supreme Court rejected a claim of denial of right to
speedy trial in Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 49 L.Ed. 950, 25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3.

S.Ct. 573 (1905).

After the accused had been indicted for federal

crimes in a New York Federal District Court, and after a continuance
had been granted, the prosecuting attorney announced an intention
not to proceed further with the New York prosecution, but instead to
have the accused removed to the District of Columbia for prosecution
under the indictments against him there.

Holding that the accused

had not been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial,
the Court emphasized that where a person is charged with more than
one crime, he cannot be tried for all at the same time; that the
accused's rights must be considered with regard to the practical
administration of justice; that the right to a speedy trial cannot
be claimed for one offense and prevent arrest for other offenses;
md that removal proceedings from one Federal District Court to
another are merely process for arrest and means of bringing a defendant
to trial.
The Supreme Court, here and in later cases, emphasizes that
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative.
'llith delays and depends upon circumstances.

defendant.

It is consistent

It secures rights to a

It does not preclude the rights of public justice".

198 U.S. 77 at 87.
and not mere speed".
L.Ed. 2d 1041,

"[T]he essential ingredient is orderly expedition
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10, 3

79 S.Ct. 991 (1959).

In Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 1 L.Ed.2d 393,
!

S.Ct. 481 (1957), the Court said in order for a violation of the

- 7 -
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constitutional right to speedy trial to exist the delay must be purposeful or oppressive.

In that case, the delay in completing pros-

ecution against the defendant by imposing a sentence was accidental
and was promptly remedied when discovered.

Because of the accidental

nature of the delay, the Court rejected appellant's claim that his
rights were violated.
There was no constitutionally impermissible denial of a
speedy trial in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 2 L.Ed.2d 913,
78 S.Ct. 829 (1958), where the defendant was tried in a New Jersey
court in October 1954, four years after the occurrence of the
alleged crime.

The Court found the following circumstances in that

case justified the delay:

l)

the defendant was imprisoned in New

York from November 1950 until January 1952; 2) he was tried in
New Jersey in May 1952 on indictments charging him with robberies
of three individuals, was acquitted, and was returned to New York
and was in prison there in July, 1952, when a New Jersey grand
jury returned an indictment charging him with robbery of a fourth
individual; 3) New Jersey reacquired him by extradition in May, 1954;
and 4) the Court in which he was tried in October, 1954, was not
in session for criminal trials during the summer months.
Though Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. l, 3 L.Ed. 2d
1041, 79 S.Ct. 991 (1959) did not involve an accused's claim of
denial of right to speedy trial, the Court enunciated a general
principle in regard to the Sixth Amendment right:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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While justice should be administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed. It is well to
note that in this very case the inordinate
speed that was generated through the filing
of the information caused many of the difficulties which led the court below to conclude
that petitioners had been deprived of due
process of law.
3 L.Ed. 2d at 1048.
Thus the Court warns against the dangers of a trial that is so

"speedy" as to render a denial of due process.
The defendants in United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 166,
15 L.Ed.2d 627, 86 S.Ct. 773 (1966), had their convictions for

violation of a federal narcotics statute vacated on the ground of a defect
in their indictments.

The Government then had them rearrested

and reindicted, and each of the new indictments, besides remedying
the defects in the earlier ones, included two new counts which
had not been charged in the previous indictments.

All counts

of the new indictments were based upon the same transaction as the

previous prosecution.

Nineteen months had passed between the time

of the accused's original arrest and the hearing on their last

indictments.

The District Court granted the defendant's motion

to dismiss the indictments on the ground that they had been denied
their Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial.
aopealed, and the Supreme Court reversed.

The Government

The purpose of the

Sixth Amendment guaranty, the Court said, is to work as a safeguard
~o

prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and

Dl

to limit the possibility that long delay will impair the ability
of an accused to defend himself.

However, because of the many

procedural safeguards provided a defendant, the ordinary procedures

e:
dl

for criminal prosecution are designed to move at a deliberate pace.
The Court again emphasized the concern of a trial that
was too "speedy":

1(

A requirement of unreasonable speed would have
a deleterious effect upon both the rights of the
accused and upon the ability of society to
protect itself.
15 L.Ed. at 631.
In United States v. Ewell, supra, the Court held that

il

cl

of

the accused must have actually been prejudiced as a result of the
prosecution's delay.

The defendant's claim was found to be insub-

stantial, speculative and premature where he had not shown any

or

ca

specific evidence which had actually disappeared or been lost and
no witnesses were known to have disappeared.

The Court could find

to

wi

no oppressive or culpable government conduct, and therefore, rejected
pr

defendant's Sixth Amendment claim.

However, in a later case, the

in

Court held that an affirmative showing of prejudice is not necessary.
rna

See Moore v. Arizona, infra.
co

The Supreme Court, in Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra,

(lS

applying the Sixth Amendment to the states through the Due Process

un,

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that the state had violated
the accused's Sixth Amendment right by entering against him a

:e:
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~lle

date.

prosequi with leave to reinstate prosecution at a future
Such a procedure would indefinately prolong the oppressive

effects of the pendency of the indictment, which would subject the
defendant to public scorn, and would prolong the anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation.
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 20 L.Ed. 2d
1047, 88 S. Ct. 2008 (1968), involved an appeal on the issue of
illegally seized evidence.

The Court summarily dismissed defendant's

claim that he was denied a right to a speedy trial where virtually all
of the delays of which he complained occurred in the course of
appellate proceedings and resulted

either from his own actions

or for the need to assure careful reveiw of an unusually complex
case.
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment may not be dispensed
, with merely because the accused under a state charge is serving a
tee
prison sentence imposed by another jurisdiction, but the state

in such case, upon accused's demand, has a constitutional duty to
'Y

make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him before the trial
court.

Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 89 S.Ct. 575

(1969). The Court rejected the notion that a man already in prison
~d

under a lawful sentence is not in a position to suffer from "undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial".

The delay may ultimately

:esul t in:
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First, the possibility that the defendant
already in prison might receive a sentence
at least partially concurrent with the one
he is serving may be forever lost if trial
of the pending charge is postponed. Secondly,
under procedures now widely practiced, the
duration of his present imprisonment may be
increased, and the conditions under which he
must serve his sentence greatly worsened, by
the pending of another criminal charge outstanding against him.
21 L.Ed.2d Ct. 611.
The "anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation" would have
an equally depressive effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who
is at large.

Also, the Court notes, the strain and anxiety could

interfere with the prisoner's ability to take maximum advantage of
his institutional opportunities for rehabilitation.
again, the concern

wit~

~he

There is,

inability of the prisoner to adequately

preprare his defense.
A seven-year delay in bringing the accused to trial resulted in a denial of the right to speedy trial.

Dickey v. State of

Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 26 L.Ed.2d 26, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970).

In that

case, the Supreme Court held that no valid reason existed for the
prosecution's deferring the trial in the face of the accused's
diligent and repeated effort to secure his constitutional right to
a speedy trial.

The Court found that there was abundant evidence

in the record that the delay had caused actual prejudice to the
accused as a result of the death of two potential witnesses, the
unavailability of another potential witness, and the loss of police
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records and, because of the delay and its consequent prejudice,
~e accused was entitled to have any further proceedings arising

out of the robbery charges dismissed.
The right to a speedy trial attaches once the putative
defendant in some way becomes an accused; the Sixth Amendment
does not apply to the period prior to arrest.

Marion v. United

States, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L.Ed. 2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455 (1971).
The accused in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L.Ed.2d
101, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), was not denied the right to a speedy

trial even though he was indicted in September, 1958, and after a
series of sixteen continuances, was not tried until October, 1963.
The Court in Barker. set out the criteria by which the speedy trial
right is to be judged.

The Court held: 1) the right to a speedy

trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other
f constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be

quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is
~possible

to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when

the right must be asserted or considered waived, 2) while a defendant's
assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a speedy trial is

me of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of such a right, the primary burden remains on the courts and
~e

prosecutors to assure that cases are speedily brought to trial,

l) a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy

:rial is subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both
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the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should
consider such factors as (a) length of the delay,
the delay,

(b) reason for

(c) the defendant's assertion or nonassertion of his

right, and (d) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay,
in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been
denied.

~~ile

the petitioner's case, involving as it did such an

extraordinary delay, was a close one, the facts that prejudice
to him was minimal and that the petitioner himself did not want a
speedy trial outweighed the deficiencies attributable to the
state's failure to try the petitioner sooner, therefore the
petitioner was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
The only possible remedy for denying the defendant the
right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the charges especially in
view of the policies underlying that Sixth Amendment right.
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 93 S.Ct.
2260 (1973).

The accused's right to a speedy trial is fundamental

and the duty to provide a prompt trial rests with the Government.
Unintentional delays caused by crowded courts or understaffed
prosecutors are given less weight than intentional or oppressive
delays, however, they still must be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances lies with the Government
rather than the defendant.

The fact that the accused, even one

who is released pending trial is not interested in being tried
quickly does not, alone, alter the prosecutor's obligation to provi~
- 14 -
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a prompt trial as the public's interest as well as the accused's
constitutional right command prompt imposition of criminal charges.
The defendant in Strunk was denied a speedy trial and charges against
~m

en

were dismissed.
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court lists prejudice to

the defendant as necessary in order to show denial of the right
to speedy tria)_. However, in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 38
L.Ed.2d 183, 94 S.Ct. 88 (1973), it was held that the four factors
to be considered in determining whether the right to speedy trial
has been denied, as enunciated in Barker, are neither necessary or
a sufficient condition to base a finding of a denial of the right
to speedy trial.

Thus, an affirmative demonstration of prejudice

w the accused is not necessary to prove a denial of his constitutional right (cf. United States v. Ewell, supra).

The Court also

ooted that prejudice is not confined to the possible prejudice to
his defense in the proceedings, but the Court must also consider,
inter alia, the possible impact which pending charges might have on
:1is prospects for parole and meaningful rehabilitation.

The defend-

ant's case in Moore was remanded for reassessment under proper
Sixth Amendment constitutional standards.
The right to a speedy trial is also guaranteed by the
:tah Constitution, Article I, Section 12.

In State v. Rasmussen,

-iS P.2d 134 (Utah, 1966), it was held that Utah Code Ann. §77-18-8(6)
d< ;953) which provides that the defendant in all criminal cases shall

-,entitled to a speedy public trial within 30 days after arraignment,
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is a statutory implementation of the constitutional guarantee to a
speedy trial.

Though the defendant in the Rasmussen case was not

brought to trial until 45 days after arraignment, the Court held
the deiay was not a denial of defendant's right to a speedy trial
where the circumstances causing the delay were beyond the control
of the prosecution or the court, and where there was no intent
to prejudice the defendant.
It was argued in State v. Lozano, 462 P.2d 710 (Utah, 1969)
that Utah Code Ann. §77-18-8(6)

(1953) is mandatory.

The Court

a

rejected the argument and said that the provision is not mandatory
but directory, and "each case must be examined in light of its own
particular facts".

m

However, where defendant was arrested on January

1, made two demands for the speedy trial, objected to prosecutor's
request for continuance on July 12, and was not brought to trial
until August 5, the Court held that incarceration prior to trial,
without cause or excuse, was undue and oppressive and constituted
denial of defendant's right to speedy trial under the United States
and Utah Constitutions.
The defendant in State v. Mathis, 319 P. 2d 134 (Utah, 1957) B,
claimed that a 13-day delay in being brought to trial constituted

t

a denial of his Sixth Amendment right.

h

The Court noted that anyone

accused of a crime, especially one incarcerated awaiting trial, is
entitled to have his case tried with all possible dispatch, if he so

t:

desires, citing the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12.

d,
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The

defendant also based his claim upon Utah Code Ann. §77-51-1 (1953)
~ich

deals with dismissal for failure to prosecute, which is a

legislative implementation of the constitutional guarantee of a
speedy trial.

The Court found no transgression from that statute.

In addition, there was no reversible error where the prosecutor
did not file an affidavit for continuance pursuant to §77-29-1 regarding postponement of trial, but instead orally made the motion
i9) for continuance and gave statements in support thereof.

"In the

absence of any indication of lack of good faith or of diligence
on the part of the state which resulted in a substantial infringement upon the defendant's rights or in some manner prevented or imry

paired his ability to defend", the Court said, the granting of
a continuance is well within the trial court's discretion.
In the case of State v. Renzo, 443 P.2d 392 (Utah, 1968),
the Court held that the constitutonal speedy trial guarantee is not
applicable until after prosecution is instituted, and prosecution

s

is instituted when an indictment is returned or an information
filed.

57)

The Court also restated the rule enunciated in State v.

Bohn, 248 P.ll9 (Utah, 1926), that "a defendant cannot claim
that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated unless

te

~e

asks the court to grant him a trial".

443 P. 2d at 395.

See

also Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817 (lOth Cir. 1940) where
so

the Court said that in the absence of an affirmative request or

demand for trial, it is presumed that the accused acquiesced in the
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delay and therefore cannot complain.

Note that the United States

Supreme Court in Barker lists the absence of an affirmative request
as only a factor to consider.
However, a statutory right to a speedy trial cannot be
forfeited by the defendant's silence.

In State v. Wilson, 453 P.2d

158 (Utah, 1969), the accused did not forfeit

his right to have

charges against him dismissed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-65-2
(1953) by remaining silent and failing to request an earlier setting
when the trial court set date for trial beyond the 90-day period
required under §77-65-1.

The Court held that the burden of com-

plying with the statute rests on the prosecutor.
The pret=ial delays in the above entitled case occurred
when this case was

d.~l.2:ec1

in order to try an armed robbery case

against the same appellant (R. 75).

Continuances in the armed

robbery case and the necessity for a re-trial of that case following
a hung jury in the intial trial were required.

At that time,

counsel for appellant waived the 90-day disposition theretofore
filed in order to allow re-trial of the robbery case first
(R.

76).

Arraignment on the escape charge occurred September

1, 1978, and the appellant was not tried until January 15 of the
following year.

Appellant contends that the delay of a four and

a half months was in violation of the appellant's constitutional
rights to a speedy trial.
Pursuant to the cases cited above, counsel for the appellant requests the Court to decide lvhether or not the proceedings
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this case warrant a dismissal for the failure of the State to

grant the appellant a speedy trial.

Appellant contends that the

delays prior to trial preclude the State from going forward at
the time of trial.
POINT III
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT PROSECUTION CONVICTION AND
SENTENCillG OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF ESCAPE CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND/OR DOUBLE
PUNISHMENT FOR SAID CRIME.

g

The appellant contends that the punishment levied against
the appellant by the Board of Pardons in the form of re-setting of
the appellant's release date incarceration in maxiumum security and
other penalties levied against the appellant, constitute punishment
~r

the crime and that it is inappropriate for him to be convicted

and punished by the Court in an additional proceeding (R. 76) .

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be
"twice put in jeopardy" for the "same offense".

That provision

~s

made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause

o:

the Fourteenth Amendment.

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 785

(1969) .

The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 also pro:1ibi ts

double jeopardy.

The statutory enactment of that constitu-

:ional right is Utah Code Ann. §77-1-10 (1953).
Neither the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
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Court have addressed the precise issue of whether a criminal prosecution for crime of escape is prohibited by the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution because the escapee was, on his recapture, a
subjected to discipline by prison authorities for the prison discipline violation involved.

5

There is, however, an abundance of

case law in other jurisdictions.

5

The unanimous consensus on that issue is that a defendant
who is criminally prosecuted for escape from prison is not twice

51

put in jeopardy even though he is subject to discipline by the prison ll
board for his attempted escape.

The reasoning is that the proceeding Si

before the prison board is administrative and not judicial.
v. Conson, 237 P. 799 (Cal. 1925).
and common-law sense,
tions only.

~as

"Jeopardy" in its constitutional

a strict application to criminal prosecu-

p

~!'

1:

Disciplinary actions by order of the warden for escape

is not a criminal prosecution.
1953).

People

Ex Parte Kirk,

252 P. 2d 1032 (Okla.,

Vi

For plea of double jeopardy to be invoked, it is incumbent

(1

upon appellant to show that he has previously been placed on trial

Co

before a court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment or

F.

information for the same offense.

(5

(Hash., 1960).

State v. Williams, 356 P.2d 99

Statute providing that an escape shall not be eligibli Ci

for parole or the accumulation of good time for certain period sub-

~

sequent to his recapture and return to prison does not impose addi-

l9

tional punishment amounting to double jeopardy.
of Colorado, 407 P.2d 38 (Colo., 1965).

Silva v. People

Hhere administrative penalt
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imposed does not result in confinement beyond maximum term set in
imposed sentence, no double jeopardy or double punishment attaches

re, as a result of prosecution under felonious escape statute.

Schwickrath v. People of Colorado, 4ll P. 2d 961 (Colo., 1966).
State v. Williams, 493 P.2d 258 (Kan., 1972); Collins v. State,
524 P. 2d 715 (Kan., 1974); Shuman v. Sheriff of Carson City, 523
p 2d 841 (Nev.,

1974); State v. Millican, 501 P.2d 1076 (N.M., 1977);

State v. Budau, 518 P.2d 1225 (N.M., 1974); Boyle v. State, 569 P.2d

>on 1026 (Okla.,

1977); Nelson v. State, 567 P.2d 522 (Okla., 1977);

.ng State v. Kennedy, 453 P.2d 658 (Ore., 1969); Taylor v. Oregon, 530
P 2d 526 (Ore., 1975); State v. Bowling, 459 P.2d 454 (Ore., 1969);
1 ~!artz v.

1

State, 566 P.2d 222 (Wyo., 1977); Hamby v. State, 559 P.2d

1388 (Wyo. , 1977).

Other cases in support of the above rule are State v.
Vinson, 443 P.2d 700 (Ariz., 1968); Turner v. Gore, 175 S.W. 2d 317
(Tenn., 1943); State v. Head, 32 A.2d 273 (Conn., 1943); State v.
Canez., 246 So. 2d 793 (La., 1971); Patterson v. United States, 183
F.2d 327 (4th Cir., 1950); Mullican v.

United States, 252 F.2d 398

(5th Cir., 1958); United States v. Lepiscopo, 429 F.2d 258 (5th
b1,
•· Cir., 1970); United States v. Apker, 419 F.2d 388 (9th Cir., 1969);
~van

v. State of Louisiana, 314 F.Supp. 1047 (U.S.D.C., E.D., La.,

!970) .

c:
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CONCLUSION
Counsel for the appellant respectfully submits the above
entitled analysis of the points of law raised by the appellant and
requests permission to withdraw, believing the appeal is without
meritorious grounds.

The counsel for the appellant further sub-

mits that the foregoing brief discusses all the law applicable
to the only points that could arguably be presented on appeal.
DATED this _ _ day of July, 1979.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

BRAD RICH
Attorney at Law
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